Interviews with Ammar Abdulhamid

The fact that [Syrian President Bashar] Assad came from a minority background, that he projected himself as a protector of minorities gave him a ready-made loyalist base of support. And people can be vehement in his support not simply because they love Assad but because they really think that any chink in the shield might, you know and any change in the system, you know, could have dangerous repercussions for their own basic rights.

The Alawites [a religious sect with roots in Shia Islam], in particular, were never acknowledged as a legitimate religious community, historically speaking. Under the Ottoman Empire [the Ottoman Turks’ empire that existed from 1299 to 1922 and served as the precursor to modern day Turkey] the confessional system that the Ottomans used, known as the millet system [separate legal courts pertaining to personal law under which minorities were allowed to rule themselves with little interference from the Ottoman government], acknowledged a lot of religious communities except the Alawites.

So the Alawites had a historical memory of being marginalized, shunned, and unaccepted. And the only time in history, for hundreds of years, that they had a chance to be leaders or part of the power base system was under Assad. Assad preyed on this a lot. And so here you´re talking about change. And the Alawites are afraid that the change will come at their expense. And the problem is the regime not only played on that, but it also overtly became Alawite. And by playing it in this overt manner, it trapped the Alawite community in, you know in this position.

The failure of the opposition to come up with a vision and to come up with an elaborate sort of statement on how the rights of the Alawite community can be protected, how they can be protected from being marginalized. It´s not enough to say to a community of 10 percent of the Syrian people that, “Look, you will have citizenship and equality.” Ten percent in, say in the decision making on a national level, it´s nothing. You know, it means that you will never really be influential. Democracy is not simply about, you know, majority rule.

There are always some protections for minorities and special considerations. And that aspect was never really understood by the traditional Sunni [the largest branch of Islam] position. They understood minority protections. “We won´t interfere in your worship.” They did not think of it in socioeconomic terms, that it means jobs and an investment in infrastructure in our part of Syria, an ability to be part of the centralized decision-making process, even in a way that may not be commensurate with the demographic size.

It has to be a little bit more. That kind of a system seemed anti-democratic to some Sunni scholars. They did not realize that, in fact, this is the kind of system that is elaborated in so many western democracies. And yet, it functions. It´s viable. And there is a lot that we can learn here. And that this is how you, in fact, ease minority fears by showing them they are not going to be marginalized because their demographic size is so small. But they will be given an opportunity to flourish.

These concepts were not part of our culture. So a combination of all these factors made the situation in Syria tough to handle and made the situation devolve into the bloody mayhem and mess that you see today.

Ammar Abdulhamid is a Syrian human rights activist who in 2003 founded the Tharwa Foundation, a grassroots organization that enlists local activists and citizen journalists to document conditions in Syria. In response to his activities, the Syrian government subjected Abdulhamid to repeat interrogation and threats. In September 2005, he and his family were forced into exile in the United States. From his home in Maryland, Abdulhamid remains one of the leading bloggers and commentators on events in Syria through the Syrian Revolution Digest.

Follow Ammar Ahbdulhamid on Twitter @Tharwacolamus and on his blog, Syrian Revolution Digest.