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Freedom Collection

Interviews with Max du Preez

Interviewed May 20, 2024

It’s a debate that we’ve had and we are still having in this country, is why did [Frederick Willem] de Klerk make that speech of February 1990 which unlocked this whole process, the unbanning of the ANC [African National Congress] and the release of [Nelson] Mandela? I think there’s no single answer. I mean, I’ve had conversations with him about this, with de Klerk about this, and it’s clear also that there isn’t one answer. [Frederick Willem de Klerk (1936 – ) served as President of South Africa from 1989 – 1994. Under de Klerk’s leadership the apartheid system was dismantled, the African National Congress’ 30 year ban ended, political prisoners were released and majority (multiracial) elections were established. Nelson Mandela (1918 – 2013) was a South African anti-apartheid revolutionary and politician who served as the first post-apartheid President of South Africa from 1994-1999. Banning was a legal process during apartheid enabled primarily by the Suppression of Communism Act, where individuals were prohibited from communicating with more than one person at a time and from traveling domestically or internationally without permission. Organizations were also banned by the government. The media was restricted in covering banned individuals. The African National Congress (ANC) is a political party that served as the most prominent resistance movement against South Africa’s apartheid system, at times resorting to violence through its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe. It was officially banned by the South African government from 1960 to 1990. As apartheid collapsed, the ANC’s leader, Nelson Mandela, was elected President of South Africa in 1994 and established a democratic government.]

Partly South Africa was in trouble in terms of violence inside, internal uprisings, but also in terms of the economy. The economy was in real bad trouble. It was virtually bankrupt by the late ‘80s. The internal resistance of the UDF [United Democratic Front] and the trade unions made it clear that they cannot be controlled. You could not put five million people in jail. You could not keep them separate anymore. They were unstoppable, and they were making the country ungovernable. [The United Democratic Front was a multiracial anti-apartheid coalition.]

I always said and I still say it now in stuff I write that the internal resistance, the UDF and COSATU [Congress of South African Trade Unions], the trade union federation, should get more credit for forcing the apartheid government to the negotiating table than the African National Congress in exile or Umkhonto we Sizwe, their military wing. The real heroes were the UDF and COSATU, the trade unionists, and they also suffered more in terms of torture and detention. When you lived in exile, you lived in exile.

So that was the one—it was becoming very hard. So there was pressure from business, saying, “Well, let’s change something so it would be better to make business, to do business in this society.” That pressure also came from Afrikaner business, and government and Afrikaans business were always very close together, because the Afrikaners had now, from the 1960s, ‘70s on, become members of the middle class. They’d become quite prosperous. By the ‘80s they were really established as—in the economy, where they weren’t before. They were the poorer white cousins in the country.

[Afrikaners are the descendants of Dutch settlers who came to Africa’s Cape of Good Hope in 1652. During the Anglo-Boer Wars that spanned the 19th and 20th centuries, the Afrikaners were overtaken by the British Empire and agreed to live under British rule.]

So Afrikaner nationalism had a socialist background and as they—post 1948 when they took over the white government and took over the civil service and they had a massive program of helping—pulling themselves up from their bootstraps, you know, through the Afrikaner Broederbond and all kinds of organizations—a very smart model of empowering an ethnic group, whatever their motivations. But it really worked. So by the ‘60s they—‘70s especially, they were now middleclass people and they were enjoying the good life. And now this newfound good life was being threatened, so there was that pressure.

[The Afrikaner Broederbond, or Afrikaner Brotherhood in English, was a South African secret society composed of Afrikaans-speaking, Protestant, white men over the age of 25 that was established in 1918.]

So you throw all these things together and that creates a certain atmosphere. Now you throw in two other things. The one is that President P.W. Botha has a stroke and he’s incapacitated, so suddenly the known, strong leader is gone. And they choose another guy, and what does he do? It can’t be more business as usual. So there was the—the scene was set for de Klerk to do something and the pressure on him was immense.

[Pieter Willem Botha (1916 – 2006) served as the prime minister of South Africa from 1978 to 1984 and as president from 1984 to 1989. He was a strong proponent of apartheid. In 1989, he suffered a stroke and was forced to step down from the presidency and the leadership of the ruling National Party.]

And the final piece of the puzzle was the fall of the Berlin Wall. Initially Afrikaner nationalism used the communist threat as a reason why apartheid was important, because the liberation movement, the African National Congress, and the Communist Party were communists and terrorists and they would impose a communist, Marxist system, and South Africa would become a satellite of Moscow. And a lot of otherwise sober, decent people fell for this argument fueled by the intelligence services and embroidered upon by especially the military. You know, we called it the Rooi Gevaar, the Red Danger, and people generally feared it. I mean, young—decent young white men went and died in Angola and elsewhere because they thought they were fighting the godless communists.

But when international communism started disintegrating in ’88, ’89 and the Berlin Wall fell, no more argument like that.

Now you throw all this in this pot, and a bit of guts, a bit of good decision making from de Klerk, and that’s what happened on the 2nd of February, 1990. I don’t think he—if he knew what that would trigger, how that would develop, that he wouldn’t have done quite so much. He would’ve held back a little bit. But the minute Nelson Mandela walked from jail, there was no stopping the process. It unleashed a kind of a gentle but assertive people’s power in the country and a massive expectation all over the world of a settlement, because you know, when the National Party and their security forces realized in the mid, late ‘80s that they’re not gonna win this war, maybe a deal should be done, at exactly the same time the ANC realized that they can’t win this war. And they can wait until this country is completely destroyed, or they can make a deal. I had those conversations with ANC people at that time, ’85, ’86 in Lusaka [Zambia] and elsewhere.

[The National Party, founded in 1914, ruled South Africa from 1948 to 1994. Its following included mostly Dutch-descended Afrikaners and English-speaking whites. The National Party was long dedicated to policies of apartheid and white supremacy. By the early 1990s, the party had moved toward sharing power with South Africa’s black majority.]

So it all just conspired and got together in February 1990, and then went out of control for de Klerk. He didn’t get the constitution he wanted. He wanted a white veto. He wanted minority rights to be protected. He wanted white rights to be protected. He wanted white schools in white neighborhoods and stuff. And mercifully history just walked all over—it was like a locomotive that just ran, and what we got was what we had to get.