More than 7.7 million Venezuelans have fled their country since 2014 – one of the largest displacement crises in the world. Democratic backsliding into authoritarian rule, kleptocracy, and successive economic crises preceded this mass exodus, which saw Venezuelans scatter across South America, the U.S., and Spain in search of freedom and opportunity.
I’ve been thinking about this in the context of a recent piece in The Washington Post detailing executive branch conversations about imposing additional sanctions on Venezuela and whether or not those sanctions would drive outmigration.
Sanctions have been in place against Venezuela for years and across multiple presidential administrations. I’ll let the foreign policy experts argue about the value and usefulness of them as a tool to fight the corruption and human rights abuses there – the Venezuelan government is ultimately responsible for the terrible conditions it has imposed on its people –
but Venezuelan outmigration increased after the sanctions were imposed.
About 3 million Venezuelans left for Colombia, and Mexico saw hundreds of thousands transit through on their way to the U.S. Returning them to Venezuela from the U.S. is nearly impossible given the state of our diplomatic relationship (and that of course assumes that it’s in the U.S. interest to return them to their authoritarian government).
Foreign policy priorities can impact migration. That doesn’t mean those policies shouldn’t be pursued. But policymakers must treat potential effects seriously and design reforms that account for those effects.